Instability as the Norm: Why Latin American Constitutions Fail to Endure

Abstract

Latin America has historically been prone to constitutional change, reflected both in the promulgation of new constitutions and in hundreds of reforms since the onset of the third wave of democratization. This article argues that the "death" of Latin American constitutions does not stem solely from abrupt ruptures of the democratic order, but from a gradual process of institutional erosion. This process is explained by three interrelated factors: a postcolonial legacy that bequeathed weak institutions and a political culture of selective rule compliance; the manipulation of formal rules by political and economic elites who exploit constitutional flexibility for short-term gain; and the tendency to constitutionalize programmatic promises and social aspirations, which inflates citizen expectations and weakens the constitution's regulatory capacity. The analysis shows that these dynamics not only erode the institutional framework but also directly affect citizens' daily lives, generating legal uncertainty, distrust, and greater vulnerability to forms of competitive authoritarianism. The article concludes by proposing a reform agenda aimed at strengthening the separation of powers, judicial independence, and legal certainty, as well as recovering a more sober conception of the role constitutions should play in the region.